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FCSA Sale to Rabobank: Selling What? On 
Whose Authority? And For Whose Benefit?
Roger Ginder
Rabobank’s proposed buyout of Farm Credit Services of
America (FCSA) would not, on its face, seem to be a radi-
cal event. Buyouts, mergers, and consolidations are cer-
tainly not an uncommon event in the US economy. Aren’t
buyouts nothing more than one of the methods firms use
to adjust to changes in market conditions? Absent any
egregious anticompetitive side effects, they usually occur
with a minimum of fanfare beyond the press releases of the
parties involved.
But in the case of FCSA, there were strong and some-
times strident outcries from a number of quite varied
sources. Challenges were coming not only from some of
the current FCSA members, but also from former direc-
tors and members, other farm credit institutions, and even
some US congressmen and senators. Just what made the
proposed FCSA deal so different from all of the others?
At least some of the differences observed in the Ra-
bobank-FCSA case are related to the ambiguities created
by (a) the FCSA charter and its intent; (b) the relation-
ships of FCSA to the rest of the Farm Credit System
(FCS); (c) the historical background of the FCSA entity;
(d) the fact that FCSA is organized as a cooperative rather
than an investor-oriented corporation (IOC); and (e) the
FCSA pattern of retaining its earnings as unallocated equi-
ty rather than allocating it to borrowers. These factors not
only create a larger set of stakeholders than would typically
be the case for an IOC, but they also create a much differ-
ent set of claims and expectations.
The Charter
The charter for the FCS banks or Agricultural Credit As-
sociations differ from typical commercial bank charters in
a couple of important ways. The vast majority of corporate
charters, including those for commercial banking corpora-
tions, are issued by the states. In addition, the charter is re-
quired to enter the banking business. These banking char-
ters are issued and regulated by either state banking
authorities, or the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (OCC) in the case of national banks, and usually
permit the holder to take deposits from the public. The
charters issued to the Farm Credit System banks do not
permit depository rights and are issued by the federal gov-
ernment in accordance with farm credit legislation passed
by Congress. But, there is another key difference. FCS
charters are issued in a way that guarantees that there is an
FCS bank serving the producers in all geographic areas of
the United States. Thus, the charters are issued as a means
of meeting a legislative mandate rather than simply en-
abling the establishment of a commercial entity. At a min-
imum this complicates the question of selling an FCS
Bank or Ag Credit Association such as FCSA to a non-
FCS entity.
After such a sale, the legislative mandate still exists for
the FCS to serve the geographic area. However, the opera-
tional means to accomplish the mandate has been sold to a
noneligible entity that is beyond the reach of the FCS reg-
ulators. There is always the option to charter a new FCS
entity and start over. However, it could take years before
the new entity could develop significant market share, be-
come well capitalized, and effectively serve the market.
The “new start-up” solution also ignores the question of
whether there is a genuine need for an additional player in
the market. Just how the intended uniform access to the
FCS would be achieved remains an issue in this kind of
transaction.
Whether the current shareholders of an FCS chartered
Agricultural Credit Association or a FCS bank have the
unilateral authority to liquidate the capital built up while
it was operating under that FCS charter is also an open
question. In addition to the unique responsibilities man-
dated by the charter, there are also unique advantages. The
charter carries some significant tax and funds acquisition32 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
advantages for building equity and
reserves that would generally not be
available to other non-FCS institu-
tions.
As long as the FCS-chartered en-
tity continues to perform its legisla-
tive mandate, these advantages are
more easily defended. But when a
group of stockholders attempt to sell
the Agricultural Credit Association
or bank and distribute its accumulat-
ed unallocated surplus and reserves,
the special treatment may be less de-
fensible. The action would not only
leave the FCS entity in a poor posi-
tion to perform on its legislative
mandate, it would also create a more
favorable treatment for the current
set of FCS Agricultural Credit Asso-
ciation stockholders than the treat-
ment accorded similar sets of stock-
holders in other non-FCS lenders.
The Other Banks in the Farm 
Credit System
Other banks in the system were clear-
ly not supportive of the sale, and
some raised vocal opposition to their
members, regulators, and the press. It
would appear that the stockholders
of FCSA would have the undisputed
authority to sell or dissolve without
any obligation to the other parts of
the FCS. All of the Farm Credit Sys-
tem banks and associations (includ-
ing CoBank, AgroBank, etc.) are in-
dependent business entities with
separate balance sheets governed by
separate boards of directors and
owned by distinct sets of stockhold-
ers. Why should other FCS banks
and Agricultural Credit Associations
care if FCSA dissolves itself?
Despite the autonomy of each
FCS bank or entity in most visible re-
spects, they have some less obvious
interdependencies and shared respon-
sibilities. When FCS bonds are sold
into the financial markets, they are
sold for the entire FCS as a whole
rather than individual FCS chartered
banks or associations. This means
that exit of an FCS entity with signif-
icant loan volume has the potential
impact of reducing the size of issues.
Likewise, exit of an FCS entity serv-
ing a specific region may marginally
reduce the geographic and commodi-
ty diversity of the portfolio behind
the issue. Perhaps even more signifi-
cantly, all of the banks and associa-
tions in the system are “jointly and
severally liable” for the bonds issued.
Stated differently, in the event that an
FCS entity fails and cannot meet its
obligations to bondholders, a formal
set of loss-sharing procedures defined
among the remaining FCS entities is
triggered.
Thus, a portion of the equity in
all FCS banks or Agricultural Credit
Associations serves as the first line of
defense when a system entity cannot
meet its obligation to FCS bond-
holders. This procedure was last trig-
gered in the mid-1980s during the
farm debt crisis, when capital from
all parts of the Farm Credit System
was used to prevent default when
some of the banks began to fail. Sub-
sequently, even this measure proved
inadequate. Assistance from the US
government was required to partially
recapitalize many of the entities in
the Farm Credit System to avoid a
default on bonds that had been is-
sued.
When it became apparent that
US government assistance would be
required to avoid default, the FCS
banks and Agricultural Credit Associ-
ations did not approach the govern-
ment individually. Instead, the Farm
Credit System as a whole made a uni-
fied request. When the money pro-
vided by the government to avoid de-
fault was repaid in the 1990s, it was
done through the system. FCSA ben-
efited from these system-wide activi-
ties at a critical point in its history.
Although the individual Farm
Credit System entities operate auton-
omously with respect to managing
and capitalizing their activities, the
authority for an entity to unilaterally
decide to sell or liquidate itself re-
mains unclear. The agreements for
joint and several liability and the es-
tablished patterns of joint behavior in
times of great crisis for FCSA creates
some ambiguity about the true extent
of this autonomy. At a minimum,
there is a serious question about
whether any bank that has benefited
from loss sharing and government as-
sistance has absolutely no obligation
to the rest of the system and is free to
behave in a way that diminishes the
stature and effectiveness of the sys-
tem.
Organization as a Cooperative 
Versus an IOC
Firms organized as cooperatives share
many characteristics with firms orga-
nized as investor-oriented corpora-
tions. Both are state-chartered corpo-
rate entities controlled by elected
directors with a fiduciary responsibil-
ity to shareholders who have invested
equity capital. Both are subject to
market forces and may fail unless ex-
plicit intervention by government
prevents it. To the general public,
there are few visible differences as the
firms go about their day-to-day busi-
ness.
There are, however, a number of
important differences between the
two. Capitalization is one key differ-
ence. In a cooperative, the people us-
ing the products and services of the
firm usually provide the equity capi-
tal required by the firm. In virtually
all cases, some level of capitalization
is required if the user is to share in
the profits generated from the firm’s1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1) CHOICES 33
operation. Some cooperatives re-
quire capital to be provided not only
as a condition for sharing in the prof-
its generated by the cooperative, but
also as a prior condition for gaining
access to the products and services
the cooperative produces. Farm
Credit System banks impose this re-
quirement on their borrowers.
In contrast, the investment activi-
ty in an IOC and the access to the
firm’s services are completely decou-
pled. A consumer of the IOC’s goods
and services may or may not choose
to be an investor and an investor in
the IOC may or may not choose to
use the firm’s products and services.
Any melding of the role of investor
and consumer is strictly voluntary
and occurs entirely at the pleasure of
the party involved.
Distribution of net margins or
profits is another important differ-
ence between cooperatives and
IOC’s. Net profit margins generated
by IOC’s are distributed to stock-
holders based on the amount of equi-
ty provided. If the net margins are re-
tained in the business instead of
being distributed to stockholders, the
value of the IOC is expected to in-
crease. The presumption is that
shareholders will receive more for
their shares when they sell them and
thereby capture the value.
Cooperatives generally distribute
net margins based on the level of
business that a member shareholder
has done with the cooperative rather
than the level of investment the
member shareholder has made in the
cooperative. The idea is to operate on
an “at-cost” basis by returning any
excess net margins above actual cost
to those who were charged more than
actual cost when they purchased
products and services from the co-op.
It is also common for cooperatives to
distribute at least a portion of the net
margins as equity rather than cash.
This creates a pool of equity that has
been retained to meet the need for
additional equity. However, unlike
the retained earnings in the IOC,
these earnings have been identified
with individual stockholder names,
and there is an expectation that it will
be redeemed in cash at some future
date. It should be noted that most
cooperatives hold some of the net
margins as unallocated surplus re-
serves. It permits some level of oper-
ating loss to be absorbed without
canceling some of the equity that has
been allocated in prior years. (How-
ever, it is not at all common for a co-
operative to retain virtually all of the
earnings as unallocated equity, as
FCSA did.)
Because members who do more
business with the cooperative receive
a proportionately greater percentage
of the earnings, they also contribute a
proportionately greater percentage of
the allocated equity under this ar-
rangement. Stated differently, their
ownership of the cooperative is kept
in rough proportion to their use. As
long as the stockholder’s equity con-
tribution is roughly proportional to
the level of business done with the
cooperative, there is little quantita-
tive difference between what the
stockholder would have received had
the net margins been distributed
based on the amount of equity he or
she held.
This raises the question: If there
is little or no difference, then why
not just organize as an IOC and pay
out the net margins based on profits?
The answer lies in the motivation the
founders have for forming the orga-
nization. If the motivation is simply
to maximize return on capital invest-
ed, then the IOC is the superior
choice. Once formed, the IOC is free
to seek out maximum return to
shareholder capital as its singular goal
and pursue any legal opportunity to
do so. 
However, if the motivation is to
address some sort of market failure
(such as providing a product or ser-
vice that is underprovided by the
market or providing increased com-
petition in the marketplace), the co-
operative may be a better choice. In
that case, the founders want to limit
the activity of the firm to those mar-
kets they use and wish to influence.
Although it is still important to gen-
erate a return on shareholder invest-
ment, maximizing return on invest-
ment is not the singular goal. A dual
goal of correcting market failure and
generating an acceptable return on
invested capital is pursued. An addi-
tional consequence of the dual goal is
a more complex board of director’s fi-
duciary responsibility to sharehold-
ers.
A third important difference be-
tween cooperatives and IOC’s is the
way that owners exit the business. In
the typical publicly traded IOC (and
some that are not publicly traded),
the IOC assumes no responsibility to
redeem its stock in cash. The stock-
holder must sell the shares to a third
party in order to receive the value of
his or her interest in the company.
Potential buyers of the stock are pre-
sumed to capitalize any undistributed
net earnings into the share price;
thus, the sale of stock incorporates
the value of any undistributed net
margins due the shareholder into the
share price.
In contrast to the IOC, coopera-
tives typically redeem purchased
shares of stock at the same face value
it had at the time of purchase. Net
margins that have been issued as eq-
uity for later redemption are handled
in a similar fashion. This creates no
problem as long as the cooperative al-
locates all of the net margins to indi-
vidually identified users of the coop-34 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
erative. When a member exits, he or
she has explicit rights to both the
purchased share and the allocated net
margins received while actively using
the cooperative.
However, if net margins have
been retained as unallocated surplus
(without an identified user’s name at-
tached), a serious problem arises in
reflecting the increased value of the
firm when the stockholder no longer
needs the co-op and wishes to exit.
The share price is fixed and will be
redeemed at the same value it had
when it was purchased. If the net
margins have been held in unallocat-
ed form instead of allocated, the
shareholder has no explicit rights to
them. Absent any explicit claims, co-
operative members receive the value
of the unallocated surplus only upon
sale or dissolution—an extreme mea-
sure.
Because few (if any) FCSA earn-
ings had been allocated since the
mid-1980s, this was precisely the sit-
uation confronting FCSA sharehold-
ers in 2004. Following the farm debt
crisis of the mid-1980s and the pas-
sage of the Agricultural Credit Act of
1987, FCSA and its predecessor
banks had dutifully repaid govern-
ment assistance given, capitalized an
insurance fund, and steadily rebuilt
reserves by withholding earnings as
unallocated surplus reserves.
Under the leadership of the board
of directors (and most likely at the
behest of regulators), members bor-
rowing from the bank during this pe-
riod agreed to forgo receiving allocat-
ed patronage refunds in order to
rebuild adequate reserves to provide
the bank with enough reserves to
withstand another period of disas-
trous losses without assistance from
the government. Apparently, most
borrowers felt that ensuring the exist-
ence of a viable Farm Credit System
bank dedicated to providing a consis-
tent source of competitively priced
long- and intermediate-term credit to
agriculture was worthy of the sacri-
fice.
Some would argue that FCSA
had gone past the level of reserves re-
quired for prudence and could have
begun allocating equity long before it
did in late 2004. Indeed, a large
number of the sister Agricultural
Credit Associations and FCS banks
in the Farm Credit System (including
CoBank) had done so. Perhaps this
was due to an incomplete under-
standing about the differences be-
tween cooperatives and IOC’s and
the inability of cooperative stock-
holders to access unallocated reserves.
Or, perhaps the turmoil experienced
in the 1980s caused the manage-
ment and board of FCSA to act with
an abundance of caution and to con-
tinue to build unallocated reserves.
One can only speculate about the
motives, but the fact that Federal
Land Bank sourced earnings could be
placed into surplus without taxation
almost certainly played at least some
role. It enabled these earnings to be
placed into surplus without a tax
consequence. Had these earnings
been allocated to members, either the
member who received the allocation
or the co-op would have had to pay
income tax on them.
The Offer From Rabobank
By early 2004, FCSA found itself
holding a very large pool of unallo-
cated equity with no visible way
(short of sale or liquidation) for
members to access it. This made it an
ideal target for an outside offer to
purchase. Sale of the FCSA would re-
sult in an inflow of cash; the cash
could then be distributed to current
stockholders who had purchased
shares of stock at a modest cost as a
condition for joining. The payout
would be multiples of the relatively
modest price of the shares they had
purchased. This creates an enormous
incentive to sell the cooperative, per-
haps even at a bargain price.
The payout to current sharehold-
ers would be very lucrative even if the
sale price of FCSA were significantly
less than its value as a going concern
or its fair market value. Division of
only half the fair market value (as es-
timated by some analysts) among the
relatively small number of current
stockholders would still yield a signif-
icant sum. Some large-volume bor-
rowers would receive sums in five or
six figures. All of this presumes that
the current members of FCSA hold
the only legal claims to the unallocat-
ed surplus reserves and can legiti-
mately divide the proceeds among
themselves. But are the current stock-
holders of FCSA really the exclusive
and rightful owners of the unallocat-
ed surplus?
The answer for an investor-
owned corporation (which pays its
stockholders based on the amount of
equity they hold) is straightforward.
It belongs to the current stockhold-
ers. Those who have sold their stock
and are not currently shareholders
have no claims. Presumably, the value
of retained earnings was capitalized
into the stock price when they sold
their shares. Thus, all prior stock-
holders received fair market value at
the specific time of the sale, and all of
the value of the unallocated retained
earnings would be due to current
stockholders.
In the case of FCSA (which is a
cooperative), the answer is not so
simple. Several key differences be-
tween cooperatives and ordinary in-
vestor-oriented corporations compli-
cate things. (a) Unlike the ordinary
corporation, earnings in the coopera-
tive are issued to stockholders based
on their use of the cooperative rather1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1) CHOICES 35
than on the amount of capital pro-
vided, and in nearly all cases the eq-
uity cannot be publicly traded. (b)
The decision to invest was not solely
based on generating a return on in-
vestment. For FCSA borrowers it was
also coupled with the right to use the
cooperative. The FCSA borrower had
to be a stockholder in order to use
the cooperative. (c) The equity in
FCSA is purchased and redeemed at
face value. Those who redeemed
their stock after paying off their loan
received only face value. This is radi-
cally different than what happens in
an IOC. For the IOC, the level of
unallocated retained earnings is usu-
ally reflected in the share value at the
time it is purchased and at the time
the share is sold.
When the current shareholders of
FCSA bought their shares in the co-
operative, the price they paid for the
share did not reflect the capitalized
value of the unallocated retained
earnings. But if they sold or liquidat-
ed FCSA, they stood to divide the
surplus and receive many times what
they paid for their share.
So Who Owns the Capital 
Surplus?
The ambiguities that arise from the
FCSA charter, its relationship to the
other FCS banks, FCSA’s own histo-
ry, and its cooperative structure raise
serious questions about who has le-
gitimate (if not strictly legal) claims
to the unallocated surplus reserves. A
case could be made that several dif-
ferent groups and institutions could
lay claim to at least a portion of the
reserves. At least five such potential
claimants could be identified:
• the current stockholders;
• the past stockholders who con-
tributed to building the surplus;
• the successor FCS Ag Credit
Association chartered to replace
FCSA;
• the other Farm Credit System
banks that provided assistance;
and
•t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  w h o  p r o v i d e d
the initial risk capital, special tax
treatment, and recapitalized it in
the 1980s.
The unallocated surplus in FCSA
represents an endowment generated
by past members for current (and fu-
ture members) to use in capitalizing
the lending cooperative. It was not
generated exclusively by the current
stockholders. Nor was the investment
cost for current stockholders adjusted
to reflect the level of unallocated re-
tained earnings when they entered.
Finally, the decision of individual
stockholders to buy or sell was based
on their need for credit rather than
the level of unallocated retained earn-
ings.
So who owns the surplus? Is it
those past member stockholders who
generated it by forgoing the option to
receive a patronage refund on their
interest bill? Is it the current member
stockholders who now own and use
the cooperative and will make the de-
cision of whether or not to liquidate?
Or is it possibly the future member
stockholders who will want to join a
well-capitalized Agricultural Credit
Association? Stated differently,
should the surplus be taken into the
new Agricultural Credit Association
that will be chartered to replace
FCSA after it has been sold?
One possible answer is it belongs
to those who generated the surplus
over the past 20 years or so. It could
be argued that those who owned and
used FCSA during the critical period
when FCSA was being recapitalized
in the mid-1980s have the most legit-
imate claims. However, 20 years is a
long time, and there are numerous
difficulties in looking back that far.
More than a few of those members
are now deceased and their estates
long ago settled.
Another possible answer is that
those who have the most legitimate
claims are the members who used the
cooperative over a more recent (albeit
still somewhat arbitrary) period when
much of the retained earnings were
generated. This has in some cases
been formalized in cooperative stat-
utes. Some state statutes (including
Iowa, which is part of the FCSA mar-
ket territory) designate that unallo-
cated retained earnings must be dis-
tributed to current and former
patrons based on the amount of un-
redeemed allocated equity they hold.
This kind of provision allows
those who did business with the co-
operative in the past, and contributed
to building the surplus, to share in
the distribution—even though some
of them may no longer be active
members. But in the case of FSCA,
virtually all the earnings were put
into surplus, and there is no allocated
equity to use as a basis for determin-
ing how much each patron should re-
ceive. It would be necessary to pick
some arbitrary period, look back, and
calculate what the claims would have
been if the equity actually had been
allocated rather than put into sur-
plus.
A third possible answer is that
people who are currently owners and
users have the most legitimate claim.
They, after all, have undertaken the
current fiduciary responsibility for
the assets of FCSA, and they are the
ones who have the voting rights. But,
should the entire endowment be dis-
tributed to them simply because they
happen to be members at this time?
Was it really the intent of prior mem-
bers (who built the surplus) to create
a windfall for the voting members at
some future moment in time?36 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
A fourth possible answer is that
the surplus is truly an endowment
from past and current users for use in
capitalizing a user-owned and -con-
trolled cooperative for current and
future farm borrowers. Upon sales of
liquidation, should at least the ma-
jority of the endowment be kept and
used toward capitalizing the new
FCS Agricultural Credit Association
that will have to be chartered and
formed to serve the region? Could it
be argued that those who built the
surplus did it for that purpose rather
than for the purpose of distributing it
in its entirety as a windfall gain to
current members?
Some would argue that the re-
maining parts of the system should
get at least some of the surplus. All
parts of the system assume “joint and
several liability” for the other parts. If
FCSA benefited from this assurance
during the period when the surplus
was built, does it not have a legiti-
mate claim to at least some of the
surplus? To a degree, the exit fee lev-
ied by the FCS does this, but ques-
tions can be raised about whether the
fee is more or less than adequate to
accomplish this.
Finally, some might argue that
the US taxpayers have a legitimate
claim to at least part of the unallocat-
ed reserves. The portion of the unal-
located surplus that was sourced from
land loans was never taxed. Further-
more, the system was conceived and
started by the US government, and
the majority of the capitalization
through the most risky periods of its
life came from the government.
Some might argue that the taxpayers
should have a claim.
Technically, the government as-
sistance was structured as a loan, and
it has been repaid in full. But most
would agree that at least part of these
funds played the role typically played
by equity capital rather than the role
typically played by debt capital. Is it
reasonable that some of the unallo-
cated reserves should be returned to
the taxpayers as a return for taking on
the role of entrepreneur and venture
capitalist during start-up and the
most perilous times FCSA has sur-
vived? If they are not compensated
for playing these roles, should the
taxpayers at least be compensated for
the untaxed earnings sourced from
FCSA’s land lending activities?
Going Forward from Here
The buyout process was halted before
it went to stockholders for a vote. We
will never know how it would have
played out. It is still interesting and
perhaps helpful to consider who
would have had the most just or le-
gitimate claim. Would it have been
only the narrow legal claims of cur-
rent stockholders that counted in the
end? Would it have simply been de-
cided on the provisions in FCSA arti-
cles of incorporation and provisions
in the FCSA bylaws along with board
resolutions? Or have other stakehold-
ers weighed in through the courts?
Or would Congress perhaps have
weighed in through legislation? The
answers will never be known. It may
be useful to consider the other stake-
holder claims and evaluate their mer-
it as a measuring rod for future ac-
tions. The FCSA experience implies a
need for some changes going for-
ward.
Greater effort needs to be made
in differentiating the role of the
board of directors in a cooperative
and from the role of an IOC board.
Although there are many similarities,
and both IOC and Cooperative
boards serve the same general func-
tion, the cooperative board has a
much more complex task. In many
cases, this is not well understood by
cooperative boards.
IOC commercial bank boards
have a fiduciary responsibility to pro-
tect stockholders’ investments and
maximize return on stockholders’ in-
vestments. Regulators and insuring
agencies such as the Federal Reserve,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC), and the Office of
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
in the Treasury Department place
added fiduciary responsibilities on
IOC commercial banks to protect
customers.
Cooperative boards have a similar
responsibility to protect the stock-
holders’ investments and to earn a re-
turn on the stockholder’s invest-
ment. Regulators and insurers, such
as Farm Credit Administration and
FCS Insurance Corporation, place
added fiduciary responsibilities on
cooperatively owned Agricultural
Credit Associations such as FCSA to
protect their borrowers in much the
same way that the FDIC and OCC
do for IOC commercial banks.
However, the fiduciary responsi-
bility of the cooperative board to its
congruent set of owner-users goes be-
yond that of the IOC board’s respon-
sibility to its noncongruent sets of
shareholders and customers. The fact
that the owners and the users are
congruent does not exempt the coop-
erative board from earning a return
on it invested capital. It does, howev-
er, place constraints on what the
board can do in pursuit of returns on
invested capital. Although the coop-
erative board is pursuing return on its
capital, it must also ensure that the
stockholder’s investment is applied in
a way that benefits stockholders as us-
ers as well as investors. Balancing the
two is sometimes difficult, and it
nearly always forecloses some of the
options for generating a return on
capital that are readily available to the
IOC.1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1) CHOICES 37
Greater efforts also need to be
made to assist cooperative manage-
ment and boards in understanding
the differences in the mechanics that
exist between benefit flows from
IOCs and benefit flows from cooper-
atives. Actions that are fair to IOC
shareholders will not always be fair
for cooperative shareholders. Be-
cause cooperative stock and allocated
equity is redeemed at face value, the
fiduciary responsibility of coopera-
tive directors could extend well be-
yond the contemporaneous set of
voting shareholders in many cases.
Simply copying IOC behavior will
not always lead to a similar result in a
cooperative. It is important for coop-
erative boards to understand this and
communicate it effectively to hired
management—especially when the
prior experience base of that manage-
ment has not been in the cooperative
sector.
The incentives created by the tax
exemption for Federal Land Bank
earnings also need to be carefully
evaluated. If the exemption applies
only when earnings are held as unal-
located reserves, it may create future
problems similar to the ones encoun-
tered at FCSA. One possible solution
would be to permit earnings to be al-
located as nonqualified patronage
distributions by the Agricultural
Credit Association with no taxation
until the allocation is actually re-
deemed to the borrower in cash. This
would, in essence, leave the Agricul-
tural Credit Association in the same
position it currently holds. However,
it would identify the member whose
business generated the earnings and
create an explicit future claim for that
member—even if he or she had re-
paid a loan and exited. By creating a
specific property right, this action
would eliminate some of the exiting
incentive for current stockholders to
sell or liquidate as a means of divid-
ing the unallocated surplus.
Finally, there needs to be a clearer
specification of what individual sys-
tem banks and associations have the
authority to sell unilaterally. Title to
real estate, vehicles, and fixtures are
probably not in question. It seems
clear that the FCS charter for a re-
gional bank cannot be sold to an en-
tity outside FCS. However, it is less
clear whether the loans, customer
lists, customer history, and other cus-
tomer information are the exclusive
property of the Agricultural Credit
Association or the FCS. The proce-
dures for exiting the system, and the
property rights of the stakeholder
groups, need to be much more clearly
defined before the next sale of an
FCS entity is attempted.
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